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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
In this consolidated appeal,

conviction in docket

Rand Allen Melius

number 46851.

He

also appeals

appeals from the judgment 0f

from the denial 0f

his

Rule 35

motions for reduction 0f sentences in docket numbers 46820, 46821, 46850, and 4685 1.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

In 2014, a sheriff s deputy found Melius “slouched over” in a pickup truck that

parked on the side of the roadway
89.)

The ofﬁcer observed

bottle

at

approximately 11:40

the “engine running,” the “exhaust

still

R., pp.29-31, 88-

going,” and an “open

of rum” inside the truck. (46820 R., pp.88-89.) Melius failed the standardized ﬁeld

sobriety tests and admitted that he had

state

pm. (46820

was

consumed

three beers. (46820 R., pp.29-30.)

The

charged Melius With operating a motor vehicle While under the inﬂuence of alcohol.

(46820 R., pp.80-82.)

A jury convicted Melius of DUI, and he then pled guilty to having

two prior DUI convictions
district court

pp. 142-45.)

in the preceding ten years.

(46820 R., pp.102-03, 135-36.) The

imposed a uniﬁed sentence of ﬁve years With two years ﬁxed. (46820

The court suspended the sentence and placed Melius 0n probation

R.,

for a period

0fthree years. (46820 R., p.143.)
In 2016,

truck that

two

sheriff’ s deputies

was “parked

approximately 2:47

in the

am. (46821

found Melius asleep in the driver’s seat 0f a pickup

middle 0f the road, running, with
R., p.24.)

much”

sobriety tests. (46821 R., p.24.)

lights

on”

at

Melius smelled 0f alcohol, had red and glossy

eyes as well as slurred speech, and he swayed

admitted that he had “too

its

t0 drink, but

when he

stood.

(46821 R., p.24) Melius

he refused t0 perform the standardized ﬁeld

He also refused to provide breath alcohol samples.

(46821

R., p.25.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Melius pled guilty to felony operating a motor

vehicle While under the inﬂuence of alcohol.

(46821 R., pp.47-49, 52, 57.) The

district

court imposed a uniﬁed sentence 0f eight years With four years ﬁxed, concurrent with the

sentence imposed in his 2014 case. (46821 R., pp.54-56.) The court retained jurisdiction.

(46821 R., p.55.) Following the period 0f retained jurisdiction, the court placed Melius 0n
probation for three years. (46821 R., pp.60-63.)
In 2017, a police ofﬁcer found Melius in the driver’s seat of an idling pickup truck

in a parking lot at approximately 1:00 a.m.

consumed

(46850 R., pp.20-22.) Melius denied having

alcohol, but again he failed the standardized ﬁeld sobriety tests.

pp.25, 28-301)

(46850 R.,

Melius pled guilty t0 felony operating a motor vehicle while under the

inﬂuence of alcohol. (46850 R., pp.72-74, 80-81.) The court imposed a uniﬁed sentence
of ten years With ﬁve years ﬁxed t0 run concurrent with the sentences imposed in his 2014

and 2016

cases.

(46850 R., pp.92-95.)

The

court suspended the sentence and placed

Melius 0n probation for a period of ﬁve years. (46850 R., p.93.)
Following his 20 1 6 and 20 1 7
the terms 0f his

DUI convictions, Melius admitted that he had violated

2014 probation by committing those new crimes. (46820

R., pp.155-56,

160-62, 166-67, 188.) In his 2016 case, Melius admitted that he had violated his probation

by committing

the

DUI

in his

2017

case.

(46821 R., pp.79-81, 94-95, 112.)

The court

continued Melius on probation after each probation Violation but included an additional
probation condition that required

him

to enroll in

and successﬁllly complete the Good

1

Melius was uncooperative and hostile towards the responding ofﬁcers, and he refused to
provide a breath sample. (46850 R., pp.20-21, 28-30.) Pursuant t0 a search warrant, Melius
provided a blood sample. (46850, R., pp.30, 32.)
results of that blood draw were.

It is

unclear from the record what the

Samaritan program, both inpatient and intensive outpatient treatment. (46820 R., pp.16465, 192-95;

46821

R., pp.1 13-14, 116-17.)

In 2018, a police ofﬁcer observed a pickup truck idling in a bar parking lot at

approximately 12:20 a.m.

(46851 R., p.17; 11/7/18

Tr.,

p.136, L.25

ofﬁcer discovered Melius in the driver’s seat “slumped over” as

(46851 R.,

p.

1

and observed

if

—

p.37, L.17.)

The

he was “sleeping.”

The ofﬁcer could smell the odor of alcohol coming from Melius’s person

7.)

that Melius’s speech

was

slurred

and his eyes were bloodshot and glassy.

(46851 R., p.17.) Melius denied drinking but failed the standardized ﬁeld sobriety
(46851 R., pp.17—18.)

Upon

tests.

searching the truck, the ofﬁcer located an empty beer can

under the driver’s seat and a clear bottle 0n the ﬂoor between the driver and passenger seat
that contained

an amber liquid that smelled

like beer.

(46851 R.,

p.

1

8.)

Melius reﬁlsed to

provide a breath sample, but he did consent t0 a blood draw. (46851 R., pp.18-19.) The
results

(1

of the blood draw revealed that Melius’s blood alcohol concentration was “0.245.”

1/7/18 Tr., p.201, Ls.3-16.)

The

state

charged Melius With being in physical control 0f a motor vehicle While

under the inﬂuence of alcohol.

(46851 R., pp.1

1

1-13.2)

The

state also

charged Melius

With a persistent Violator enhancement. (46851 R., p.1 12.) Melius pled not guilty, and the
case proceeded to

trial.

(46851 R., pp.67, 175-96.)

During the prosecutor’s voir dire examination 0f the jury panel, he
heard the allegation here.

It’s that

In other words, the allegation here

2

stated,

“You

Mr. Melius was in physical control of a motor vehicle.
is

that

he was behind the driver’s Wheel, in the driver’s

In the alternative, the state charged Melius under a per se theory for having “an alcohol

concentration of .08 or more, t0 Wit: .245.” (46851 R., p.1 12.)
3

seat,

with the engine running. There’s n0 allegation of driving.”

22.) Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor asked,

can be charged under the

ticky-tacky?” (1 1/7/18 Tr., p.60, L.23

The court overruled
Ls.6-7.)

1

8-

“Does anybody have a problem that you

DUI law With actual physical control if you’re behind the driver’s

seat with the engine running, but the car is not

the line of questioning

(1 1/7/1 8 Tr., p.60, Ls.

was “going

— p.61,

moving? Does anybody think

L.2.)

to the facts

the objection, ﬁnding that

Defense counsel objected, arguing that

0f the case.”

it

that is too

was “a

(1 1/7/18 Tr., p.61, Ls.3-5.)

fair question.”

(1 1/7/1 8 Tr., p.61,

The prosecutor continued:

Okay. The question was physical control. The law in Idaho is that
if you’re under the inﬂuence and you’re behind the Wheel 0f a car that’s
running, that’s actual physical control of a motor vehicle under the
inﬂuence. So I expect the Court Will tell you that’s against the law, and I’m
trying t0 ﬁgure out if anybody has a

(1

problem With

that.

1/7/18 Tr., p.62, Ls.12-18.)

response t0 the prosecutor’s

In

question,

one prospective juror expressed

uncertainty about being able t0 follow that law. (1 1/7/1 8 Tr., p.62, L.23

prosecutor

moved

t0

excuse that juror for cause.

(1 1/7/18 Tr., p.64,

— p.64,

L.20.)

Ls.21-22.) Defense

counsel obj ected and then asked the prospective juror several follow up questions.
T11, p.64,

L.23 — p.65, L.15.)

situation here that

we were

The prosecutor then asked

talking about?

Can you

set aside

about physical control and being under the inﬂuence?”

L3.) Defense counsel objected again,

the juror,

The

(1 1/7/ 1 8

“So What about the

your personal conviction

(1 1/7/18 Tr., p.65,

L.25 — p.66,

stating:

He’s asking the juror t0 essentially give his verdict right now, t0 rule
0n the case. He’s told him What he thinks the facts will show, he’s told him

what he expects Your Honor to instruct the jury on, and now he’s saying,
What Will you d0 with that information, Will you follow the law, Will you
convict him?

(1

1/7/18 Tr., p.66, Ls.4-10.)

What happened

that that’s

The court again overruled

here.

We have allegations only,

opinions on a certain kind 0f law.”

it.”

(1

it’s

far,

a very gray law, and

1/7/18 Tr., p.66, Ls.16-18.)

Can you follow

Court says that’s the law.

so

and we’re asking about

The prospective juror

(1 1/7/18 Tr., p.66, Ls.1 1-14.)

continued to voice his concerns, “I think

going along With

the objection, stating, “I disagree

it?”

I

would have a hard time

The prosecutor asked, “So, What ifthe

(1 1/7/18

TL, p.66, Ls.19-20.) Defense

counsel obj ected for a third time, arguing, “Your Honor knows what the instruction will be

The prosecutor and Your Honor know What

as well as the prosecutor.

the Witness said, gray

and

telling this juror, here’s

(1

my

room

interpretation, will

for interpretation.

you follow

On

—

The prosecutor asked him, “So you could

State is essentially

interpretation.”

(1

(1 1/7/18

1/7/18 Tr., p.67,

Ls.23-25.)

prosecutor

moved

The juror responded,

(1 1/7/ 1 8 T11, p.69, L.

see a situation

was presented, you wouldn’t follow the law because
T11, p.70,

Where

after the

1

6 — p.70,

evidence

ofthis personal conviction?” (1 1/7/ 1 8

“Possibly, yes.” (1 1/7/18 T11, p.71, L.1.)

t0 dismiss this juror for cause.

(11/7/18 Tr., p.71, Ls.2-3.)

Again, Ibelieve the prosecutor’s line 0f questioning

is

really asking

how would you vote on this case, and when the witness
it depends on how the facts come out, all he’s saying is
doesn’t know how he would decide the case.

this witness to say,

says,

I

don’t know,

The

Defense

counsel obj ected to the state’s motion to excuse the juror for cause stating:

he

as

p.68, L.8.)

A second prospective juror voiced similar concerns.
1.)

is

the prosecutor’s motion, the court excused the prospective juror for cause.

1/7/18 Tr., p.67, L.19

L.1

my

The

L.22 — p.67, L.3.) The court again overruled the objection.

T11, p.66,

L.4.)

abstract, leaves

the instruction

(1

1/7/18 Tr., p.72, L.25

—

p.73, L.4.)

The court

stated,

And

“Okay.

for the third time,

disagree” and granted the state’s motion t0 excuse the juror for cause.
Ls.5-1

(1

I

1/7/18 Tr., p.73,

1.)

A third juror was also excused for cause 0n motion by the prosecutor after she stated
she could not abide by the court’s instruction as t0 the controlling law. (1 1/7/ 1 8 Tr., p.75,

L.14 — p.76, L23.)

The prosecutor ended

this line

0f questions by asking, “I’d like to

know, was there anybody who would think they would ﬁnd themselves
for

Whatever reason, you couldn’t follow the Court’s instructions as

because of their
14.)

“Is there

own

personal feelings, sympathy, Whatever?”

anybody here

in this case after just hearing all these

(11/7/18 Tr., p.80, L.24

11/7/18 Tr., p.80, L.24

—

—

p.81, L.2.)

answers and thinking

None 0f

pertains t0 the law

it

(1 1/7/18 Tr., p.79,

that thinks they couldn’t follow the

it

where

in a situation

Ls.10-

law as the judge gives
over?

Anybody

it

at all?”

the prospective jurors answered.

(E

p.81, L.5.)

Ultimately, the jury found Melius guilty. (1 1/7/18 Tr., p.269, L.22

Melius then pled guilty t0 having two prior convictions under
past ﬁfteen years and t0 the persistent Violator enhancement.

I.C. §

(1

— p.272,

L.1

1.)

18-8004 Within the

1/7/18 Tr., p.273, L.22

—

p.275, L3.)

The court held a combined sentencing and probation

Violation disposition hearing.

(12/13/18 Tr., p.5, Ls.5-9.) In the 2018 case, the court imposed a uniﬁed sentence 0f ten
years with ﬁve years ﬁxed. (46851 R., pp.235-37.) Melius admitted to Violating the terms

of his 2014, 2016, and 2017 probations by committing the

new crime of felony DUI

2018 case and by drinking alcohol on three separate occasions. (12/13/18
21.)

The

district court

in his

Tr., p.9, Ls.1 1-

revoked probation in the 2014, 2016, and 2017 cases and executed

(46820 R., pp.237-38; 46821 R., pp.157-58; 46850 R., pp.121-

the underlying sentences.

22.)

The court ordered

46851

all

four sentences t0 run concurrently.

(12/13/18 Tr., p.40,

L23;

R., p.236.)

Melius subsequently ﬁled a Rule 35 motion for reconsideration 0f sentence in each
ofhis four cases. (46820 R., pp.239-40; 46821 R., pp.159-60; 46850 R., pp.121-22; 46851
R., pp.238-39.)

R., pp.182-83;

In the

The

46850

2018

district court

denied

R., pp.143-44;

all

46851

four motions.

R., pp.255-56.)

case, Melius ﬁled a notice

and the denial of his Rule 35 motion. (46851
the 2014, 2016, and

2017

(46820 R., pp.252-53; 46821

of appeal from the judgment 0f conviction
R., pp.251-54;

cases, Melius timely appealed

46851

V01.2, pp.10-16.)

from the orders denying

his

In

Rule

35 motions. (46820 R., pp.254-57; 46821 R., pp.172-74; 46850 R., pp.136-39; 46851 R.

V012, pp.10-16.) The Idaho Supreme Court ordered the four appeals consolidated. (46820
R., p.265.)

ISSUES
Melius

states the issues

1.

Did

0n appeal

as:

the district court abuse

its

discretion in the

2018 case When

it

allowed the State during voir dire to require prospective jurors t0
take a particular View 0f evidence t0 be adduced at trial?

Did the district court abuse its discretion in the 2018 case When it
imposed a uniﬁed sentence 0f ten years, with ﬁve years ﬁxed, upon
Mr. Melius following his conviction for physical control 0f a motor

2.

vehicle While under the inﬂuence of alcohol?

Did

3.

the district court abuse

its

discretion in all four cases

When

it

denied Mr. Melius’ Rule 35 motion for a reduction 0f sentence?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Melius

failed t0

show

that the district court

abused

its

discretion

When

it

overruled his obj ections to the scope of the prosecutor’s questions during voir dire?

2.

Has Melius

failed t0

show that the

3.

Has Melius

failed t0

show that the

his

Rule 35 motions?

district court

district court

abused

abused

its

its

sentencing discretion?

discretion

When it denied

ARGUMENT
I.

Melius Has Failed To

Show That The

District

Overruled His Obiections T0 The Scope

A.

Court Abused

Of The

Its

Discretion

When It

Prosecutor’s Voir Dire Questions

Introduction

On

appeal, Melius asserts the district court abused

his objections during the prosecutor’s voir dire

its

discretion

When

0f the jury panel because

it

overruled

improperly

it

“allowed the State during voir dire t0 require prospective jurors to take a particular View

0f evidence to be adduced
merit.

(Appellant’s brief, p.1

at trial.”

discretion,

Standard

trial

Even

if the court

abused

t0

its

any error was harmless.

“It is

the

Melius’s argument lacks

The prosecutor’s questions were proper because they were reasonably calculated

discover the possible existence of a ground for challenge.

B.

1.)

Of Review

well settled that the scope of voir dire examination

is

Within the discretion 0f

judge and that his ruling will not be disturbed except for a manifest abuse of

discretion.”

State V. Daniels, 134 Idaho 896, 898, 11 P.3d 1114,

State V. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239, 244,

discretionary decision

is

460 P.2d 374, 379 (1969)).

1116 (2000) (quoting

When

a

trial

court’s

reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered

inquiry t0 determine Whether the lower court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one 0f
discretion; (2) acted Within the outer boundaries

0f

its

discretion; (3) acted consistently

with the legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices available to

its

decision

158 (2018).

by the exercise ofreason.”

it;

and

State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270,

(4)

reached

429 P.3d 149,

Melius Has Failed T0 Carry His Burden Of Showing That The District Court
Abused Its Discretion When It Overruled His Objections During Voir Dire

C.

The

district court

did not abuse

its

discretion

when

it

overruled Melius’s repeated

m

objections during voir dire. Voir dire “presents the opportunity t0 test ‘the qualiﬁcations

of the juror’ and

m,

‘to

discover the possible existence of a ground for challenge.’”

156 Idaho 855, 862, 322 P.3d 767, 774 (2014) (citing I.C.R. 24(b)). “The goal of

voir dire

is t0

assure retention of a fair and impartial jury.” State V. Hart, 112 Idaho 759,

761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987).

T0

that end, “great latitude is

allowed in the

examination of veniremen upon their voir dire for the purposes of determining whether
there

is

sufﬁcient ground to challenge the veniremen for statutory cause, LC. [§§] 19-2017

t0 19-2022, 0r

Whether

it is

expedient to challenge them peremptorily, LC.

McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 819, 430 P.2d 886, 897

State V.

The
exists.”

parties

may

[§]

19-2016.”

(1967).

challenge a juror for statutory cause “if actual or implied bias

State V. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 609, 150 P.3d 296,

302

(Ct.

App. 2006)

(citing

LC. §§ 19-2019, 19-2020; I.C.R. 24(b) (giving procedure for voir dire examination and
challenges for cause». “Actual bias

is

deﬁned

as ‘the existence 0f a state 0f mind

0n the

part 0f the juror in reference t0 the case, or t0 either 0f the parties, Which, in the exercise

0f a sound discretion 0n the part of the

trier,

leads to the inference that he will not act with

entire impartiality.” Hauser, 143 Idaho at 609,

“[W]hen a juror admits

bias,

150 P.3d

by

610-1

1,

150 P.3d

at

(citing I.C. § 19-2019(2)).

ability t0

be

the court 0r counsel t0 elicit such an assurance, an

inference that he Will not act With entire impartiality

at

302

and gives n0 unequivocal assurance 0f the

impartial despite several efforts

Idaho

at

303-04.
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becomes inescapable.” Hauser, 143

The prosecutor’s questions

in this case

were proper because they were designed

Speciﬁcally, the prosecutor’s questions were

discover a lawful ground for challenge.

The prosecutor

reasonably calculated t0 discover the existence 0f actual bias.

posed a broad question to the
jurors’ attitudes regarding

that

entire panel,

DUI law

which was designed

He

in Idaho.

you can be charged under the DUI law With

initially

t0 reveal the prospective

asked, “Does anybody have a problem
actual physical control if you’re behind

the driver’s seat with the engine running, but the car

(11/7/18 Tr., p.60, L.23

that is too ticky-tacky?”

is

—

not moving? Does anybody think

p.61, L.2 (emphasis added).)

language used by the prosecutor here reveals his purpose in asking such a question.

simply sought to uncover the existence of a
jurors

Which would lead

state

DUI

The

He

of mind 0n the part of the prospective

t0 the inference that they

because 0f their Views of Idaho’s

to

would not

act With entire impartiality

law.

In response to this question, three prospective jurors expressed misgivings with the

law.

The prosecutor addressed those

three prospective jurors individually. After the ﬁrst

juror expressed uncertainty about his ability t0 follow the law, the prosecutor asked, “So

what about the

situation here that

we were talking

about?

Can you

set aside

your personal

conviction about physical control and being under the inﬂuence?” (1 1/7/ 1 8 Tr., p.65, L.25

— p.66,

L.3.) Likewise, the prosecutor

where

after the

asked the second juror, “So you could see a situation

evidence was presented, you wouldn’t follow the law because of [your]

personal conviction?”

(1

1/7/18 Tr., p.70, Ls.23-25.)

The prosecutor

juror Whether she could “follow the law as the Court instructs

with

it[.]”

(1 1/7/18 Tr., p.75,

L.14-22.)

.

.

.

also asked a third

[d]espite not agreeing

The prosecutor’s questions

neither explicitly nor

implicitly asked the jurors to prejudge this case 0r t0 express an opinion as t0 Melius’s

11

guilt.

Rather, like the question that the prosecutor posed to the entire panel, these questions

were designed

t0 discover

Whether these three prospective jurors could act impartially by

setting aside their personal beliefs about the

In other words, the questions

Which would

law and adhering

t0 the court’s instructions.

were reasonably calculated to reveal the jurors’ actual

establish a lawful

biases,

ground for challenge.3

Furthermore, the juror’s responses to the prosecutor’s questions support the

The

conclusion that the prosecutor’s questions were proper.
prosecutor’s questions

(1

by

stating, “I

1/7/18 TL, p.66, Ls.16-18.)

0f her personal convictions.

ﬁrst juror responded to the

would have a hard time going along With

The second

said that she

would not follow

(11/7/18 Tr., p.70, Ls.23-25; p.71, L.1)

[the 1aw].”

the law because

The

third juror

responded, “No,” that she could not follow the law even if the court told her that being in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the inﬂuence

Tr., p.76, Ls.7-9.)

None 0f

was

against the law. (1 1/7/ 1 8

the three prospective jurors responded to the prosecutor’s

question by voicing an opinion 0n Melius’s guilt or innocence, nor did they discuss the

be adduced

facts t0

at trial. Rather, all three jurors

revealed their actual bias

by

stating that

they did not think they could follow the law regardless 0f the court’s instructions. Because
the prosecutor’s questions

were reasonably calculated

t0 discover lawful

challenge—i.e., the existence 0f actual bias—the district court did not abuse

when

it

grounds for
its

discretion

overruled Melius’s repeated objections t0 the prosecutor’s questions during voir

dire.

3

The prosecutor asked

they could, in
judge.

fact, set

substantially the

same question

t0 several jurors

Who

indicated that

aside any personal opinions and follow the law as instructed

(1 1/7/18 Tr., p.75, Ls.14-20; p.78, Ls.1-15.)

0f those prospective jurors for cause.
12

by the
The prosecutor did not challenge any

Melius erroneously argues that the
applicable legal standards.

According

district court

did not act consistently with the

t0 Melius, the prosecutor’s questions called for

prejudgment 0f the case 0n evidence t0 be adduced

at trial.

“[I]nterrogations

on voir

dire

cannot require prospective jurors t0 take a particular View of evidence to be adduced
trial.”

Mattson

V.

When

Bryan, 92 Idaho 587, 590, 448 P.2d 201, 204 (1968).4

at

read

together and in context, the prosecutor’s voir dire of the jury panel did not require the

prospective jurors t0 take a particular View of the evidence to be adduced at

Contrary to Melius’s

assertion,

the

prosecutor’s

questions

trial.

did not require

prospective jurors to take a particular View of the evidence during voir dire.

Before the

prosecutor posed any questions to the jury panel, the district court read the

information t0 the prospective jurors.

(1

1/7/18 T12, p.14, L.15

—

p.15,

L25.) During the

prosecutor’s voir dire he brieﬂy referenced the allegations in this case stating,

the allegation here.

It’s that

is

that

he was behind the driver’s Wheel, in the driver’s

With the engine running. There’s n0 allegation of driving.”

22 (emphasis added).)

“You heard

Mr. Melius was in physical control 0f a motor vehicle. In

other words, the allegation here

seat,

amended

(1 1/7/1 8 Tr., p.60, Ls.

1

8-

Although the prosecutor prefaced his questions with a brief

reference t0 the allegations in this case, he did not ask the prospective jurors any questions

about the facts of this case, and he certainly did not ask the jurors to commit to a position

0n the verdict before hearing

The

all

the evidence.

district court correctly

recognized the distinction between the prosecutor’s

reference to the allegations and the questions he propounded to the prospective jurors. In

4

“[N]0 distinction is to be drawn 0n a criminal-civil basis” in the area ofvoir

v.

Bryan, 92 Idaho 587, 590, 448 P.2d 201, 204 (1968) (citing LC.
13

§

dire.

19—1905).

Mattson

response to Melius’s objections, the court stated,

“We

have allegations only, so

we’re asking about opinions on a certain kind of law.”
although the prosecutor referenced the

Again,

678 P.2d 102

allegations,

(Ct.

and

(11/7/18 Tr., p.66, Ls.11-14.)

he never required the

prospective jurors to take a particular View 0f evidence to be adduced at
State V. Camarillo, 106 Idaho 310,

far,

trial.

A review of

App. 1984), a case upon Which Melius

relies, further clariﬁes this distinction.

In Camarillo, defense counsel posed the following question to prospective jurors

during voir dire: “If we showed you that at the time of the shooting Mr. Camarillo was in
a state 0f fear and trying to protect his

injury

.

Idaho

at

.

.

[w]ou1d you,

if the

Court so

own

instructs,

life

0r protect himself from bodily

ﬁnd my client not guilty?”

Camarillo, 106

312-13, 678 P.2d at 104-05 (suggesting this question improperly incorporated

evidence Which would later be introduced

at trial

and called for prejudgment 0f the case 0n

the facts). In that case, counsel explicitly incorporated the evidence

at trial into a voir dire

particular

it

intended t0 introduce

question that explicitly required the prospective jurors to take a

View of those

facts

and commit

The prosecutor’s questions

to a position

on the

verdict.

in this case are vastly different

from the improper

question propounded in Camarillo. Unlike the defense attorney in that case, the prosecutor
in this case did not incorporate facts t0

the prospective jurors t0

be adduced

court’s instructions.

nor did he ask

commit to a position on the verdict before hearing all the evidence.

The prosecutor’s questions were designed
their expressed opinions

at trial into his questions

to ascertain

Whether the jurors could

0n the law and simply follow the controlling law

(E 11/7/18

Tr., p.66,

set aside

set forth in the

Ls.19-20; p.70, Ls.23-25; p.76, Ls.7-8.)

14

Furthermore, the prosecutor was candid about his purpose in posing such questions
t0 the jurors.

He

explained, “The law in Idaho

you’re behind the Wheel 0f a car that’s running

ﬁgure out

if anybody

has a problem with that.”

.

is

.

.

that if you’re

under the inﬂuence and

that’s against the law,

(1 1/7/1 8 Tr., p.62, Ls.

and I’m trying

to

12-18.) Because the

prosecutor did not ask the jurors t0 take a particular View 0f the evidence to be adduced at

trial,

or improperly ask

court abused

D.

Any

its

them t0 prejudge the

case,

Melius has failed t0 show that the

district

discretion.

Error In The District Court’s Rulings

On The

Scope Of Voir Dire

Was

Harmless

Even

if the

Court concludes that the

abused

district court

its

discretion

when

it

overruled Melius’s obj ections to the prosecutor’s voir dire, the error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. Error

is

not reversible unless

Idaho 169, 171, 667 P.2d 272, 274

(Ct.

irregularity 0r variance

which does not

error is not prejudicial,

and

beyond a reasonable doubt

it is

App. 1983);

prejudicial.

ﬂ

State V. Stoddard, 105

I.C.R. 52

affect substantial rights shall

(“Any

error, defect,

be disregarded”).

therefore harmless, if the reviewing court

An

is

able to declare

that the error did not contribute to the verdict.

State V. Ruiz,

is

159 Idaho 722, 724, 366 P.3d 644, 646

(Ct.

App. 2015);

ﬂ

State V. Severance, 132 Idaho

637, 639, 977 P.2d 899, 901 (Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that the prosecutor’s misuse of
voir dire, though not condoned

rights

by

0r the jury’s verdict and

the court, did not impair the defendant’s substantial

was thus harmless).

demonstrating that the alleged error was harmless. State

P.3d 961, 974 (2010).

15

The

state

V. Per_ry,

has the burden of

150 Idaho 209, 222, 245

The record reveals beyond a reasonable doubt
the verdict.

The

state

that

any error did not contribute

provided and relied upon substantial evidence as t0 each element 0f

the charged crime, including the testimony 0f the ofﬁcer

in his truck, the ofﬁcer’s

bodycam Video of his

initial

Who found Melius

slouched over

contact with Melius as well as the

administration of the ﬁeld sobriety tests, the testimony of the phlebotomist

Melius’s blood, and the expert testimony 0f a forensic scientist
for the presence

to

0f alcohol.

(1

Who

who drew

tested Melius’s blood

1/7/19 Tr., pp.130-202; State’s Exs.1-2.)

The

state’s expert

testiﬁed that the instruments used t0 test Melius’s blood for the presence 0f alcohol were

properly calibrated, that the chain of custody for Melius’s blood samples was intact, and
that Melius’s

blood alcohol concentration was measured

the legal limit.”

(11/7/19 Tr., p.199, L.24

presenting any evidence 0r testimony.

(1

—

“roughly three times

at 0.245, or

p.202, L.5.)

The defense

1/7/19 Tr., p.226, L.25

— p.229,

rested Without

L.8.) In light

of

the substantial incriminating evidence presented in this case and the lack 0f contradictory

evidence there was not a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor’s voir dire questions
affected the

outcome of the

Even

trial.

if the trial court erred

would have done

is t0

by overruling Melius’s

have replaced the jurors

the case With impartial jurors

Who had

who were

objections, the worst the court

supposedly required t0 prejudge

not been required t0 d0 so.

610, 150 P.3d at 303. Given the overwhelming evidence of Melius’s
the three jurors

who were

HLser, 143 Idaho
guilt,

and the

at

fact that

supposedly asked to prejudge the case were replaced by unbiased

and impartial jurors, any error

in the district court’s rulings

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

16

0n the scope of voir

dire

was

II.

Melius Has Failed T0
A.

Show That The

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

Melius next asserts the

district court

sentence of ten years, With ﬁve years

According

to

Melius,

the

district

recommendations by ordering him
(Appellant’s brief, p.16.)

the

community from

B.

Standard

ﬁxed

its

in the

court

discretion

2018

“should

case.

have

When it imposed a uniﬁed
(Appellant’s brief, p.16.)

followed

instead

[his]

engage in and successﬁllly complete drug court.”

Alternatively, Melius argues the district court “should have

imposed a uniﬁed sentence of six

The record supports the

to

abused

years, with three years ﬁxed.” (Appellant’s brief, p.16.)

district court’s

the risk posed

sentence 0f ten years With ﬁve years

ﬁxed t0 protect

by Melius’s repeated DUIs.

Of Review

The length of a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse 0f discretion standard

considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d
387, 391 (2007) (citing State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State

v.

C.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).

The

District

The

district court

ten years With

Court Did Not Abuse
did not abuse

ﬁve years ﬁxed

in the

its

2018

Its

Sentencing Discretion

discretion

When it imposed a uniﬁed

case.

presumed that the ﬁxed portion of the

It is

sentence will be the defendant’s probable term 0f conﬁnement.

170 P.3d
sentence

is

at

is

m,

sentence 0f

144 Idaho

at

726,

Where

a

Within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 0f demonstrating that

it

391 (citing State

V.

Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).

a clear abuse of discretion. State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

17

1, 8,

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016)

(citations omitted).

T0

carry this burden the appellant must

under any reasonable View of the

facts.

A sentence is reasonable if

it

obj ectives

P.3d

at

Li.

is

excessive

Li.

appears necessary t0 accomplish the primary obj ective

0f protecting society and t0 achieve any or
rehabilitation, 0r retribution.

show the sentence

The

0f the related goals 0f deterrence,

all

district court

has the discretion t0 weigh those

and give them differing weights When deciding upon the sentence.

Li. at 9,

368

629; State V. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (holding district

court did not abuse

its

discretion in concluding that the obj ectives of punishment,

deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In deference

to the trial judge, this

Court will not substitute

its

View of a reasonable sentence where

reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at
V. Stevens,

sentence

8,

368 P.3d

at

146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).

ﬁxed within

the limits prescribed

an abuse 0f discretion by the

trial

court.”

by

I_d.

628 (quoting

m

Furthermore, “[a]

the statute will ordinarily not be considered

(quoting State V. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645

P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).

Melius “does not assert that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.17.)

discretion, [he]

Thus, as Melius acknowledges, “in order t0 show an abuse 0f

must show that in light ofthe governing

criteria, the

considering any View 0f the facts.” (Appellant’s brief, p.17.)

The

district

cannot d0

so.

court weighed the necessary TLhills factors in determining an

appropriate sentence. (12/ 1 3/ 1 8 TL, p.38, Ls.16-19.)

been deterred by previous sanctions” and noted

5

He

sentence was excessive

The court found that Melius had “not

that “public safety is [the court’s]

Toohill V. State, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
18

primary

concern.”

—

(12/13/19 Tr., p.38, Ls.20-21; p.38, L.25

After considering

p.39, L.1.)

mitigating and aggravating factors, the court concluded that “the only reasonable

consequence for your actions

imprisonment for public

is

safety, for forced sobriety,

Which

addresses rehabilitation, for deterrence 0f yourself and others, and as a sanction for

Which

is

your seventh lifetime DUI.” (12/13/18

T11, p.39,

Ls.10-15.)

Furthermore, Melius has an extensive criminal history.
observed, this

was Melius’s

fourth felony

DUI and

(12/13/18 Tr., p.32, Ls.12-16; p.39, Ls.10-15.)

this,

As

the district court

seventh lifetime

DUI

conviction.

Melius’s four felony

DUI

convictions

occurred in quick succession: 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 respectively. Melius’s criminal
history also includes driving without privileges, resisting and obstructing, and open

container convictions.

enhancement

(PSI, p.7-9.)

Melius also pled guilty t0 the persistent Violator

in this case. (46851 R., p.1 12; 11/7/18 Tr., p.274, L.18

his conviction carried the potential for a sentence of “not less than

have “extend[ed]

and his

t0 life.”

LC.

§ 19-2514.

status as a persistent Violator

analyzed the TLhill factors, the

it

ﬁve

— p.275,

L.3.) Thus,

(5) years”

and could

In light of Melius’s extensive history of DUIs

0f the law, and because the

district court

did not abuse

its

district court

properly

sentencing discretion

when

imposed a uniﬁed sentence of ten years with ﬁve years ﬁxed.
Melius erroneously asserts the sentence imposed

is

excessive because the district

court did not adequately consider mitigating factors such as (1) the fact that he
in his truck With the engine running but not actually driving,

in drug court. (Appellant’s brief, pp.17-20.)

First, the

was

The record

and

was

sitting

(2) his desire t0 participate

belies this assertion.

record reveals that the court adequately considered the fact that Melius

in actual physical control

of the vehicle While under the inﬂuence but not actually

19

DUI

driving the truck. Referencing Melius’s four felony

0f these cases, you were

were asleep 0r passed

.

.

out,

court acknowledged that

charges against someone

p.33, L.3.)

.

highly intoxicated

.

.

[and]

.

cases the court stated, “In each

you were

in the driver’s seat,

you

and the car was running.” (12/13/18 TL, p.32, Ls.17-22.) The

“some people

Who

.

.

.

don’t understand

isn’t actually driving

However, the court also found

how

there can be [DUI]

a vehicle.” (12/13/1 8 Tr., p.32, L.23

that unlike other people,

“because [he’d] been doing the same thing for the

last four

—

Melius knew better

years” and “after the three

previous convictions [Melius knew] that was not something you can d0.” (12/13/18 T11,

Given Melius’s

p.33, Ls.16-18; p.37, Ls.10-17.)

clear understanding that being in actual

physical control of a vehicle while under the inﬂuence 0f alcohol

was a crime,

the district

court found his repeated decision t0 do so “baff[1ing].” (12/13/18 Tr., p.37, L.18.)

Nevertheless, the court took the fact that Melius

as a mitigating factor.

The

court imposed the

was not

same sentence

2017 case—ten years With ﬁve years ﬁxed—but explained
t0

impose a

19.)

less severe sentence than

it

originally intended.

Furthermore, the court explained to Melius that

his case than

history but

it

had

Who had

p.40, Ls.3-16.6)

in the case

it

driving into consideration

it

that

had imposed
it

had ultimately decided

(m 12/13/1 8

imposed a

in Melius’s

Tr., p.40,

Ls.13-

less severe sentence in

0f a similarly situated defendant With a similar criminal

actually driven a vehicle While under the inﬂuence.

(12/13/18 TL,

Thus, the court adequately considered the fact that Melius was in actual

physical control 0f the vehicle but not driving the truck in fashioning his sentence.

6

The

district court distinguished

between Melius’s case and the other case despite

recognizing that the State of Idaho does not distinguish between driving a vehicle while

under the inﬂuence of alcohol and being in actual physical control 0f a vehicle while under
the inﬂuence of alcohol. (12/13/18 TL, p.33, Ls.6-13) Both acts are prohibited under the

same

statute,

and both are subject

t0 the

same
20

penalties.

See

I.C.

§§ 18-8004, 18-8005.

Second, the

district court

properly considered Melius’s rehabilitative potential,

including his desire to try drug court, in fashioning his sentence.

The

court reviewed

Melius’s history of treatment, Which included three felony “probation[s],” the

Samaritan” program, “the rider program,” and “AA.”

“Good

(12/13/18 Tr., p.38, Ls.10-12.)

Despite these prior rehabilitative efforts, Melius continued t0 display an “unwillingness t0
refrain

from driving

.

.

.

an unwillingness t0 refrain from using alcohol, and most

importantly, an unwillingness to refrain from drinking and driving or being in actual

physical control 0f the vehicle.” (12/13/18 Tr., p.38, Ls.1-6.) Indeed, he

When

Samaritan program

the

history indicates

.

.

.

DUI

cases and noted that his “felony

DUI

is

an unwillingness on [Melius’s]

(12/13/18 TL, p.32, Ls.12-13; p.37, L.23

Thus, despite being accepted into drug court, the court concluded, “I

you

Will

comply with Drug Court

Good
The

0r gives rise t0 a concern that there

part to really engage in treatment.”

in the

Tr., p.12, Ls.9-10.)

2018 offense occurred. (12/13/18

court had presided over Melius’s four felony

was

rules 0r probation rules.”

— p.38,

L.6.)

am not conﬁdent that

(12/13/18 Tr., p.39, Ls.5-6.)

Accordingly, the court adequately considered Melius’s rehabilitative potential and his
desire t0 participate in drug court in fashioning Melius’s sentence.

In sum, the district court

weighed the appropriate

factors such as Melius’s rehabilitative potential

the pickup truck.

and the

fact that

he was not actually driving

In light of Melius’s repeated history of felony

persistent Violator 0f the law, the district court did not abuse

it

factors, including mitigating

its

DUIs and

sentencing discretion

imposed a uniﬁed sentence of ten years With ﬁve years ﬁxed. Melius has

otherwise.

21

his status as a

failed t0

when
show

Melius Has Failed T0

Show That The Dgﬁct Court Abused

Its

Discretion

When It

Denied His Rule 35 Motions
A.

Introduction

“Melius asserts that the

Finally,

When it denied his Rule 35 motions
According

district court

for a reduction

abused

its

of sentence.” (Appellant’s

t0 Melius, “his sentences are excessive in

Standard

B.

is

0f discretion.’”

Of Review

a plea for leniency, and

35

C.

is

we

at

415 P.3d 381, 385

E

203, 159 P.3d at 840).

(Ct.

App. 2015) (“A motion

“When presenting
excessive in light of

new

N0 Abuse Of The

297 P.3d 244, 251 (2013) (quoting

also State V. Anderson, 163 Idaho 513,

for reduction

essentially a plea for leniency, addressed to the

Melius Has Shown

motion for reduction of sentence

review the denial 0f the motion for an abuse

State V. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 288,

Huffman, 144 Idaho
5 17,

(Appellant’s brief, p.22.)

fails.

“‘If a sentence is Within the statutory limits, a

under Rule 35

brief, p.21.)

View 0f the new and/or additional

information presented in support of the Rule 35 motions.”

Melius’s argument

discretion in all four cases

0f sentence under I.C.R.

sound discretion of the court”).

District Court’s Discretion

a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must

show

that the sentence is

0r additional information subsequently provided to the district

court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”

State V. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729,

316 P.3d

640, 645 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). “In conducting our review of the grant or
denial 0f a Rule 35 motion,

we

consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used

22

0f the original sentence.” Anderson, 163 Idaho

for determining the reasonableness

415 P.3d

district court

exercised sound discretion

motions for reduction of sentences.
“concern With [Melius]

do the same

is

.

.

.

that

The

when

When

it

And

there

[he’s] out in the

the original sentence

felt that

is

denied Melius’s Rule 35

community,

a danger.”

What the law

when

(m 2/
it

1

enhancement

t0 extend the length

it

The

it

t0

had already

could have used the

of his sentence but chose

5/ 1 9 Tr., p.19, Ls.12- 1 9.) Accordingly, the court did not

abuse

its

discretion

denied Melius’s requests for leniency.
light

0f the following

and/or additional information: (1) that 0n a scale 0f one t0 ﬁfty he had scored a zero

on his

initial risk

compound work

and needs assessment
in the

community;

at the prison; (2) that

(3) that

possible level an inmate can be assessed

at;

he had been approved for off

he had been assessed by

and

(Appellant’s brief, pp.2 1 -22.)

on militates

State V. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 773,

its

at the

lowest

expected him to

way 0n

to parole.

The ﬂaw in Melius’s argument is that none ofthe new and/or

additional information that Melius relies

did not abuse

IDOC

(4) that his counsel fully

be a model prisoner, to not have any problems, and to earn his

E

its

and put[s]

imposed was warranted because Melius “need[ed]

Melius incorrectly argues that his sentences are excessive in

new

is

(2/15/19 Tr., p.19, Ls.20-25.)

exercised leniency in imposing the original sentence because

to.

that

[he] continue[s] to

get [the] message.” (2/1 5/19 Tr., p.20, L.3.) Moreover, the court noted that

persistent Violator sentencing

was

basis of the court’s conclusion

thing; [he] ﬂout[s] the law, [he] thumb[s] his nose at

[himself] into this position.

not

517,

at 385.

The

court

at

discretion in giving

little

in favor

of a reduction of his sentence.

229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010) (“[T]he
0r n0 weight t0 Cobler’s

23

district court

good behavior While

in

prison”); State V. Copenhaver, 129 Idaho 494, 496, 927 P.2d 884, 886 (1996) (“The district
court further did not abuse

in prison

its

discretion in refusing t0

View Copenhaver’s good behavior

between his sentencing and the Rule 35 hearing as a mitigating

denying the Rule 35 motions, the

district court correctly stated that

with whether Melius would “be a model prisoner.” (2/1 5/ 19 TL,
potential

reward for good behavior in prison

is

parole,

it

p. 19,

not

W

Accordingly, Melius has failed t0 show that the district court abused

factor.”).

In

was not concerned

Ls.20-21 .) Melius’s

a reduced

its

sentence.

discretion

When

it

denied his Rule 35 motions for reduction 0f sentences.

The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm the judgment of conviction and

the orders denying Melius’s Rule 35 motions for reduction of sentences.

DATED this 4th day 0f February,

2020.

/s/

Justin R. Porter

JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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